maximization (see Siebert 1997) . But the tables were turned by the financial crisis, which set the U.S. and most other economies on a path of "secular stagnation" while jumpstarting a German resurgence. The result has been an obsession, most prominently perhaps in France and Britain, with "the German model"-the benchmark against which to judge national economic performance.
Figure 1 Germany's Recovery (2008Q1-2011Q1)
Note: The index of real GDP for 2008Q1 = 100.
Source: Quarterly real GDP data are from the Eurostat Database.
The essence of this model, so the dominant narrative goes, goes back to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's drastic labour market reforms (the Hartz reforms), which created strong price or cost competitiveness of Germany's export-oriented manufacturing sector (Dadush 2010; OECD 2012; Ma and McCauley 2013) . Mainstream commentators praise Germany as the only EMU country that got it all right and they set it up as the example to be followed by the crisisridden Eurozone members. This view has become codified in policy in the Euro Plus Pact (adopted by the European Council in March 2011), the core aim of which is to foster Eurozone (unit labour cost) competitiveness and net exports via labour market deregulation and welfare state reform, in conjunction with fiscal austerity (Gros 2011; Gabrisch and Staehr 2014) . More progressive observers are buying into the same narrative centered around relative unit labour costs (RULC) by problematizing Germany's "mercantilistic" wage and trade policies (Priewe 2011) . "Germany has pursued a policy of aggressive wage restraint resulting in large current account surpluses," writes Stockhammer (2011) , and "German gains in competitiveness (since the introduction of the Euro) have not been founded on superior technological performance, but on more effective wage suppression." Bibow (2012) argues the same, claiming that "not German engineering ingenuity, but wage restraint gave German exporters an extra boost." Lapavitsas et al. (2010, p. 2) in a fairly typical statement, write: "Germany has gained [cost] competitiveness within the Eurozone for the sole reason that it has been able to squeeze its workers harder [than the rest of the Eurozone]." Germany's growing trade surpluses with Southern Europe are proof of Germany's success in "beggaring" its Mediterranean neighbours. "With German unit labour costs undercutting those in other countries by an increasing margin, its exports flourished and its imports slowed down", write Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2013) . These heterodox observers of course strongly reject the neoliberal reforms propagated by the Euro Plus Pact, but-following the same logic-argue instead for strong (relative) German wage increases to reduce Germany's external surplus and help rebalance the Eurozone (see also Darvas 2012; De Grauwe 2012; Sinn 2013 ).
To us, all this is flawed economics. Germany's resilience cannot be explained in terms of its (superior) international cost competitiveness, nor can one attribute the Eurozone imbalances to differences in relative unit labour costs. Germany's rebound is not due to the Hartz reforms and "effective wage suppression". Far from it. We argue that Germany's remarkable rebound must be explained in terms of the country's superior technological performance giving rise to strong non-price competitiveness. Germany's technological prowess, in turn, is founded on economic coordination and strongly market-guiding industrial policies-not cost competition.
We begin by questioning the conventional wisdom and argue that changes in RULC do not explain Germany's superior export performance. We proceed to providing evidence on Germany's technological competitiveness-and its determinants. We further consider how "wage suppression" has actually been damaging to Germany's aggregate performance. The Euro Plus Pact has wrongly reinforced the belief that crisis countries are crisis countries because of weak unit labour cost competitiveness and Germany is strong because of strong cost competitiveness. The wrong lessons have been learned from Germany's rapid rebound from crisis and this is leading to large avoidable economic costs.
Unit labour cost competitiveness: does it matter for Germany?
Competitiveness indicators are known to be weak predictors of future export performance (Gros 2011 ; Gaulier and Vicard 2012)-we need only to refer to the well-known "Kaldor paradox" (Kaldor 1978) which holds that the effects of growing relative (labour) costs or prices on exports or market shares are rather weak and often perverse (Fagerberg 1988; Carlin, Glyn and Van Reenen 2001; Naastepad 2007, 2012; Felipe and Kumar 2011) . The main factors influencing differences in international competitiveness and growth across countries are technological (non-price) competitiveness and (high-tech) productive capabilities. Joseph Schumpeter (1943, p. 84) summarized the key point vividly as follows:
"Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they saw. ( ... ) But in capitalist reality, as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of competition which counts, but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization ( ... ) -competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives."
If this holds true anywhere, it should be true for Germany, which is dominating world markets for medium-and high-technology manufacturing goods and services. Germany has a market share of 18% in the total world exports of the top-100 most complex products-against France 3.6%, Italy 3.1%, and Spain 0.9% (Felipe and Kumar 2011) -and "up-market products", which fetch the highest prices, account for more than half of German exports. Let us therefore tackle the issue head-on, and test the proposition that RULC are a key determinant of Germany's exports, imports and trade surplus. We estimated the following export and import demand functions (linear in growth rates) for 1996Q2-2008Q4 (growth denoted by a hat "^"):
( Bussière et al. 2011) . We therefore reject the hypothesis that RULC matter for Germany's trade performance.
This can also be seen directly by looking at the impact of RULC on Germany's trade surplus. Since . Defining the trade balance, b, in growth rates as the difference between export and import growth and using (1) and (2), we get:
and impose real exchange rate stability 0 = c . The "warranted rate of growth" then equals:
Substituting (4) in (3) gives the following expression for b :
We use the ratio of imports to GDP as the dependent variable in equation (2), constraining the income elasticity of import demand to unity.
If actual GDP growth is close to its long-run "warranted" rate of growth, i.e.
, then the constant term on the right hand-side is zero, and b is a function of only RULC growth. If actual growth exceeds "warranted" growth, then the constant term will be negative (and vice versa) .
Column (3) in Table 1 shows that for Germany, the constant term is not statistically significant.
We also find no statistically significant coefficient RULC growth, which confirms our (insignificant) results for C ε and C η in columns (1) and (2). The bottom-line is that RULC are basically irrelevant and Germany's superior net export performance is not founded upon effective wage suppression. These may appear freak findings, but they are not: we find ourselves in good company concluding that RULC do not matter much for competitiveness. For instance, IMF economists Danninger and Joutz (2007, p. 15) , in an econometric investigation of Germany's export growth (1993q1-2005q4) , find that relative cost improvements accounted for less than 2% of German export growth. ECB economists Di Mauro and Forster (2008, p. 16) concur, concluding that "since the late 1990s there have been signs of 3 When dismissing RULC as a factor determining competitiveness and current account imbalance, we are not implying that the same holds true for the (real) exchange rate. Unlike RULC, the exchange rate is a "macro price": any change in the exchange rate will change the total foreigncurrency price (and not just the labour cost component).
this correlation [between RULC and export growth] weakening …" European Commission (2010) recognizes that Germany's massive export boom over 1999-2010 is almost completely due to the growth of its export markets, while the contribution of lower RULC to German export growth is barely noticeable. World Bank economists Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013, p. 17) find, based on the estimation of a panel-data analysis over 1975-2011 for 13 Eurozone countries, that for the Eurozone core, the contribution of RULC changes to external imbalances appears negligible (explaining only around 1 percent).
4 Econometric analyses for Germany by Schröder (2011) and for the EU by Gaulier and Vicard (2012) and Gabrisch and Staehr's (2014) increases are passed on into p), the elasticity of the gross output price p with respect to ULC is:
ξ (= ULC/p) the share of wage cost in gross output price. These findings show how the kind of visual-infographic-argumentation as by Bibow (2012) and Ma and McCauley (2013) can go bad.
costs and the profit mark-up is around 12%. Using these numbers, p ULC ε takes a value of 0.22 to 0.26. What this means is that if manufacturing ULC increase by one percentage point, the gross output price increases by just 0.22-0.26% when we assume the complete "pass-through" of higher labour costs onto prices. The implication is, to illustrate, that a relative-price elasticity of export demand of ─1 is consistent with a RULC elasticity of export demand of around ─0.25.
However, if cost pass-through is not complete, but, say, only one-half (which is realistic), a relative-price elasticity of export demand of ─1 is consistent with a RULC elasticity of export demand of just ─0.13. What is not understood by most, is that RULC trade elasticities by definition take a value of only one-fourth to one-eighth of the respective price elasticities (in absolute terms). Note: # relative price elasticities have been converted into RULC elasticities as explained in the text. Table 3 presents an overview of the empirical estimates of RULC elasticities of Germany's imports and exports. However, most studies estimated relative price elasticities, which we converted to RULC elasticities by dividing them by four (which amounts to assuming complete cost "pass-through" as in equation (5)). The average RULC elasticity of demand for German exports (in Table 3 ) takes a value of ─0.16, which is close to the findings of Onaran and
Galanis (2012) and Storm and Naastepad (2012) -the only two studies directly estimating the RULC elasticity of German exports. The average RULC elasticity of Germany's import demand (in Table 3 ) is just 0.06. Hence, while it is (always) possible to dispute our econometric findings in Table 1 , the accumulated evidence of "from the stage in which price or labour cost competition was all they saw."
Technological competitiveness matters
To reinforce our point, we look at German wage and labour productivity growth in a comparative perspective in Table 4 . The comparison is done in terms of nominal wage gaps, (real) labour productivity gaps and gaps in unit labour costs between Germany and the 16-countries' Eurozone (excluding Germany) averaged for the 1990s and 2000s. We consider wages, productivity levels and ULC in manufacturing, the non-traded sector and in the aggregate
economy. An aggregate wage gap of ─25.4% between Italy and Germany during the 1990s means that the Italian wage rate per hour worked was about 25 percent lower than the hourly German wage rate. Table 4 paints a rich picture. We can only draw out a few main points. First, there is no sign of a nominal wage squeeze on German workers if we compare Germany to the Eurozone: German wages actually increased relative to the rest in manufacturing (the wage gap rose from ─24.3% in the 1990s to ─28.2% in the 2000s), in non-tradables (the gap increased from ─3.8% to ─9.8%) and also for the economy as a whole. German wage restraint thus was outdone by wage moderation elsewhere. Second, Germany managed to strongly increase the hourly productivity of its workers relative to productivity levels in the Eurozone. The totaleconomy gap between German and Eurozone productivity increased from ─0.4% in the 1990s to ─9.3% in the 2000s-a significant achievement that goes mostly unrecognized. German manufacturing contributed to this, but it was already operating at a productivity level that was 8% higher than that of the Eurozone (on average) in the 1990s; the gap increased to 11% in 2000s. But the bigger factor responsible for the widening of German-Eurozone productivity levels has been the relative leap in labour productivity in Germany's non-traded sector-while non-traded sector productivity levels were equal in Germany and the Eurozone in the 1990s, non-traded activities in the other Eurozone economies lost out to their German counterparts in the 2000s in a big way; the productivity gap rose to 9.6%. This finding may appear puzzling, but the key to understanding it lies in the fact that there was far bigger increase in the number of jobs in Germany's non-traded sector than in the number of hours worked. Most of the non-traded employment was in part-time jobs, often even "mini-jobs"-an institutionalized form of forced work sharing imposed upon a large proportion of the German labour force by means of the deregulatory Hartz reforms (since 2003). Other Eurozone countries did worse, mostly because of lower levels of part-time employment (and higher growth of total hours worked).
Germany's (higher) ULC declined relative to those of the rest of the Eurozone-the gap was ─10.6% in the 1990s but just ─7.4% in the 2000s. This was not at all due, as explained, to relative wage restraint in Germany, as German hourly nominal wages did increase compared to the Eurozone. The fall in Germany's ULC must be completely attributed to Germany's outstanding productivity performance. Relative ULC in German manufacturing increased (because relative German hourly wages increased more than relative labour productivity), but they fell in the German non-traded sector (again: because of superior relative productivity performance). The conclusion must be that Germany excelled in building up strong technological capabilities, which in turn resulted in higher productivity growth and non-price competitiveness.
There has been no wage squeeze in manufacturing (compared to the Eurozone), while
Germany's wage restraint in non-traded activities has been less tight than overall Eurozone wage moderation. However, it is important to dig deeper and look more closely to what Germany is exporting and to which destinations it is exporting. This has been done in studies by the ECB (2005, 2010) and Cafiso (2009) , which use "constant market share analysis" to decompose Eurozone export performance into a "structure effect" (SE) and a so-called "competitiveness effect". If a country is specialized in commodities and destination markets where demand growth is above average in comparison to other products and markets, its share in world exports must increase if it manages to maintain constant market shares in these dynamic commodities and geographical destinations. This influence on a country's overall export market share of the commodity composition of its exports as well as its destination markets is called the structure effect. Once the structure effect is determined, a country's export market share growth can be decomposed into the structure effect and a residual term, known as the competitiveness effect (CE), which-by definition-captures the influence of price as well as non-price factors (including R&D, regulation and institutions). Table 5 presents estimates of the "structure" and "competitiveness" effects for selected Eurozone economies in the period 1996-2007. As can be seen, Germany's export market share benefited from an advantageous export structure, geared towards rapidly growing regions, including non-euro EU countries, Russia and China (ECB 2005; Danninger and Joutz 2007; EC 2009 ); and to robustly growing medium-tech industries (chemicals, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles & machinery), for which world markets are growing at an above-average rate. On account of this "structure effect", Germany's export market share would have increased by 1.46% per year. But, and remarkably so, Germany's actual export market share growth was just 0.45% per year. This implies that the CE for Germany was negative, reducing German export growth by about 1%-point below world export growth. "Made in Germany" therefore lost competitive edge, notwithstanding the decline in its RULC. Table 5 includes a decomposition of export growth for France, Italy and Spain (relative to German performance). All three specialize in products for which export markets are growing less rapidly than markets for German products, and all three cater to relatively less dynamic destinations than German exporters. Italy and especially France are doing worse than Germany in terms of the competitiveness effect (while Spain gained export market as a result of a positive CE). German firms managed to hook into global demand and build up comparative advantage in large number of specialized products, unlike most other Eurozone countries. The point is that Deutschland AG did not get carried away by a focus on costs and prices, but continued to encourage long-termism in manufacturing activities-concentrating on building up manufacturing non-price competitiveness (captured by its high SE), which shows up in "Made in Germany" standing for strong product design, quality, high-tech content and reliability. This long-termism was predicated on a system of cooperative capitalism, with "checks and balances" on firms', banks' and unions' behaviour and markets, which works because it creates commitment, both of employees (who think as they work) and of bank finance, which is fundamental to innovation, technical change and continuous improvement. As Wolfgang Streeck (2013) explains, the "constraints [imposed on Germany's firms] eventually proved beneficial.
Firms accepted the challenge and got ahead by improving and innovating, particularly in the global market, focusing on quality not price."
6 It is to this model of cooperative capitalism that we now turn. (2005) . Notes: Export market share growth of country i is defined as the difference between country i's export growth and global export growth. (a) The "structure effect" is the growth rate differential which is due to a country's specialization; (b) the "destination market effect" measures whether specialization is tilted towards higher-growth destination markets; (c) the "commodity composition" effect measures whether specialization is directed towards higher-growth product markets; (d) the interaction effect embodies the impact of particular product-market combinations; and (e) the "competitiveness effect" is the residual.
Modell Deutschland 2.0
There is a lot written on Germany's corporatist economic model (e.g., Streeck 1997 Streeck , 2009 Carlin and Soskice 2009; Hassel 2011; Bastasin 2013) . German corporatism dates back to the post-war ordo-liberal Sozialmarktwirtschaft-a coordinated ("konzertierte") and regulated version of To do so, we have to go back to the German reunification of 1990, as a result of which Germany's population and workforce both increased by about 26% (Canova and Ravn 2000) .
Following a short-lived unification boom, the unemployment rate jumped up in a clear break with the historical (rising) trend of West-German unemployment. It reached an unprecedented 12.7% (or 4.5 million employees) in 1997 (Priewe 2011) To sustain economic activity and prevent unemployment from rising even more, Germany's government, in response, went from a fiscal surplus of more than 1% of GDP during the bubble years to a fiscal deficit of 4% of GDP after the bubble burst. This "Keynesian" budgetary stance, while ostensibly violating the EU's Maastricht Treaty, did offset half of the decline in private demand (Koo 2010 ).
(Batasin 2013). A strategy of wage restraint can be rationalized politically if it helps generate employment growth-even if the economy is wage-led (see Storm and Naastepad 2012) ; after all, with more than one-in-ten workers unemployed, the electorate's main concern is jobs. The point is that in a wage-led economy, the reduction in real wage growth may slow down labour productivity growth even more than output growth, in the process raising employment growth.
This happened in Germany, as is illustrated in Table 7 by the increase in Germany's aggregate employment elasticity relative to GDP from 0.04% in the 1990s to 0.12% in the 2000s. What it means is that if real GDP growth increases by one percentage point, this is associated with 0.12 %-point of additional employment growth. The employment elasticity in manufacturing is negative-the sector is shedding work while growing-but it became less negative. But it is clear that a technologically advanced manufacturing sector is not creating but destroying employment (this has been happening even more dramatically in French manufacturing). That only leaves the non-traded (services) sector as the place to create employment-mostly in the form of low-paid, low-productive temporary part-time (mini) jobs. Hence, the employment elasticity in non-traded activities increased from 0.18% in the 1990s to 0.23% in the 2000s.
Wage restraint paid off in more hours of work, but not spectacularly so; quite a few jobs, we recall, have been outsourced to the East. The employment intensity of German growth is actually quite low in European comparison-especially when compared with the employment intensity of non-traded sector output in France, Italy and Spain. But although employment growth measured in hours was only modest, German job growth has been much higher, because of a drastic increase in part-time jobs in services (Hassel 2011 ).
This does bring us to the growing dualization of Germany's political economy into a technologically competitive core of "internationally exposed" manufacturing sectors, employing skilled high-productivity workers who are well protected by employment legislation and social security, and a "domestic periphery" consisting of a "sheltered" services & construction sector, employing lower-skilled lower-productivity workers who work part-time and fixed-term, often in Germany than in any other OECD country (and the country has been catching up quickly with the Anglo-Saxon economies). Income inequality and poverty in Germany increased by more in five years (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) than in the previous 15 years combined (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . 10 Labour market deregulation-for the non-core employees-has been the main driver of rising inequality. With this structural-profoundly dualistic-understanding of institutional change we can turn to Germany's rebound. There is further evidence for Germany that more credit-worthy firms opt for a long-term relationship with a Hausbank, while less credit-worthy firms opt for shorter-term relations with arm's length banks (Memmel et al. 2008 ).
Germany's extraordinary recovery
If Germany's strong rebound from crisis was due to its superior (technological) competitiveness, it follows that Germany owes its recovery more to its "old" coordinated core than to the deregulated sheltered segment of its economy. We indeed believe this is the case. First of all, it has to be recognized that recovery was helped by the contribution of the German welfare state's automatic stabilizers and two stimulus and bailout programmes (in November 2008 German stimulus was the largest one of all major European nations and it was more than twice as big as that of France (Vail 2014) . The German stimulus provided targeted support to the Mittelstand and reinforced existing (export) strengths rather than shoring up incomes and stabilizing aggregate demand (Vail 2014, p. 77) . And it reestablished basic confidence and kept the economy afloat. Germany's version of the U.S. "cash for clunkers" programme (amounting to 5 billion euro), which granted hundreds of thousands consumers buying new cars €2,500 for their old cars, protected core employment in export-oriented manufacturing (mainly the auto supplies industry) and kept intact domestic production networks of Germany's automotive industry. The effects of these stabilizers were considerably augmented by the decision of the government to help firms bridge the economic slump by funding part-time support for workers.
The legal framework for the programme has existed in German social legislation for decades.
11
Lured by the higher profitability of Wall Street's investment banks, Deutsche Bank abandoned its traditional semi-public role (offering long-term "subsidized" loans), pressing the German government to weaken stakeholder control in favour of shareholder control by the stock market. Searching for quick profits, large German banks became heavily invested in the U.S. shadow banking system, ultimately ending up with a big direct and indirect balance-sheet exposure to toxic securities and treasury bonds from highly-indebted Southern-European countries. These structural problems of Germany's highly leveraged financial sector are still far from resolved (Bastasin 2013 ).
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The numbers are from Spiegel Online (2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/akeynesian-success-story-germany-s-new-economic-miracle-a-707231.html; but also see Vail (2014) for an excellent analysis of German and French stimulus packages. with a perfect product portfolio. We must add that high and growing inequalities in the emerging economies also helped, because the top elites prefer luxurious consumptions (mostly cars), made in Germany. Equally important, public short-time provisions helped stabilize German consumer spending, since short-time workers have more disposable and safer income than the unemployed.
As Table 6 shows, steady domestic demand led Germany's recovery during 2009-2013, while overall export growth dropped off. It was "by far the most important adjustment mechanism" (Hassel 2011, p. 29) . We concur with Beck and Scherrer (2010) workers' sense of entitlement to job security and welfare, and improve labour mobility. What is not understood is that, as Robert Solow (1998) remarked, every one of these regulations was intended to promote a desirable social purpose-often as a "second-best" response to a "market failure" (see Lee and McCann 2011) . Moreover, in flexible labour markets, firms will invest less in workers' firm-specific human capital and this hurts productivity as well (Auer et al. 2005) .
Labour market deregulation may affect productivity through its impact on worker motivation and effort, as it erodes social capital and trust in the labour relation Naastepad 2009, 2012) . Likewise, lower wages and more flexible labour slow down the process of Marx-biased technical change (Foley and Michl 1999) , enabling inefficient firms to stay in the market and discouraging structural change. It also reduces the pace at which older vintages of capital stock are being scrapped and new equipment, embodying the latest more productive technologies, is being installed (Hein and Tarassow 2010) . Taken together, lower wage growth gets reflected in lower labour productivity growth and weaker export performance (Buchele and Christiansen 1999; Naastepad 2009, 2012; Kleinknecht et al. 2013) . Hence, it is wrong to claim that the TINA road to recovery for Europe's peripheral countries is cutting wages (and deregulating labour markets) so as to improve their relative cost competitiveness. Eurozone debtor countries, forced to mold their economies to resemble Germany's relatively lowproductive non-traded sector, will never be able to close their productivity gaps with Germany's core sector-but instead will get trapped in low-wage low-productivity activities with an export specialization that overlaps with even-more-low-wage China. 14 This is an uphill battle they cannot win (see Storm and Naastepad 2014) . It will entrench a two-tier Europe with two classes of members, as both Ulrich Beck (2013) and George Soros (2014) fear, which will likely prove unstable. But not only mainstream economists have been learning the wrong lessons, heterodox observers have taken the mistaken view that all that is needed to save the Eurozone is: higher wages in Germany (Stockhammer 2011; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013) . While higher German wages may help restore domestic demand growth in Germany itself, they are no substitute for a radically rethought industrial policy for the Eurozone periphery, which should replace of the broken Euro Plus Pact. Such a rethought industrial policy should be based on the understanding that it is not cost-based market competition which is driving innovation, but rather social coordination and regulation of economic decision-making and active guidance by an entrepreneurial state (Lucchese and Pianta 2012; Mazzucato 2013; Storm and Naastepad 2012) .
So what are the right lessons?
Our anamnesis of Germany's recovery leads to a few important lessons for the Eurozone. The first one actually concerns a weakness of the German model-and it is related to Germany's over-reliance on exports as a source of demand ( for them in their domestic market, German banks overconfidently turned to the more dynamic periphery, creating the credit to co-finance the construction & real-estate booms and consumer binges-in the expectation that in the new ECB-governed single-currency area, peripheral institutions and incomes would converge to those of Europe's core countries and hence their credit risks would turn out to be small (Lane and Pels 2012; Lane 2013) . It needs no elaboration how this unlikely gamble unraveled. We just point out that due to Germany's stunted investment demand, German banks were unable to step up lending domestically and were forced to turn to foreign borrowers-financing activities that were not necessarily always productive. And it is through helping financing unsustainable credit booms in the periphery (rather than through effective wage restraint) that Germany has been implicated in plotting the Eurozone crisis.
The second lesson concerns an inconvenient truth: Germany's overall success hides from view the dualization of its economy into "first-class" firms and workers (in manufacturing) and "second-class" firms and workers (in non-traded services). High productivity in Germany's dynamic manufacturing core comes at the cost of employment: between 1980 and 2007, manufacturing real GDP increased by 112.2 billion euros (in real terms), while the total number of hours worked in this sector declined by 6.1 billion, which is the equivalent of about 3.7 million full-time jobs. 15 Over the same time period, employment in non-tradable services has increased by only 2 million full-time jobs, which has meant that many people are now working in part-time jobs. As Table 8 illustrates, a similar dynamics applies to the Eurozone as a whole and to France, Italy and Spain. This points to a paradox. While in the new international division of labour, Eurozone countries have to specialize in medium-and high-tech (knowledgeintensive) manufacturing (and services), basically competing on technological competences, this strategy is going to generate additional unemployment. One way to solve this conundrum is having low-wage low-productive mini-jobs as in Germany's sheltered sector, or as in the U.S.
But this will imply greater inequality and more working poor-in short, greater social and political instability and vulnerability. The other-royal-road to go would be to redistribute working time in the core itself, reducing full-time working jobs and/or earlier (not later) retirement. If at all possible, it would involve a grand social compromise-and commitment to a broad-based accessible educational system (as the German apprenticeship one). 15 We assume here that a full-time job is equivalent to 1650 hours of work per annum. However, the main lesson to draw from Germany's remarkable rebound is a simple one:
the stronger is a country's technological competitiveness and the more effective is its consensual macro-governance structure (based on coordinated burden sharing), the more likely this country will weather a crisis. Germany's rebound has nothing to do with unit labour costs, wage squeezing or beggaring its Eurozone neighbours. It is the success of Modell Deutschland 1.0-not of version 2.0. Rather than tilt at the windmills of RULC, under the delusion that labour cost competitiveness matters, the Eurozone periphery should instead be aided in the-much more complex-task of industrial restructuring and upgrading. This implies giving up austerity, relaxing financial and economic policies rather than curbing them, and transferring resourceslong-term and for productive purposes-from Europe's core to its periphery (rather than the other way around, as is the case now). Although this remedy is clearly not a live option now, we regard it as an impossible truth-not recognizing it, does not mean it is wrong, contrary to what an ostrich would want to believe. Perhaps we can make our point more clearly by contextualizing our proposed remedy, using a historical analogy. Our plea that industrial restructuring in the periphery needs funding from the core is analogous to Keynes' plea for a more generous peace at the Versailles Conference. Keynes argued that German reparations should be limited so as not to cripple its post-war economic recovery, war debts should be forgiven and the U.S. government should launch a lending programme to restore European investment. Doing so, Keynes argued, was a matter of enlightened national interest, because the recovery of continental Europe would, in turn, be beneficial to Britain and the U.S. A similar agenda is needed today-the difference being that forgiveness should come this time from Germany. Eurozone recovery will be of vital interest to Germany's core sector (even if Germany's financial sector stands to lose), while a long-lasting Eurozone stagnation and the accompanying political disorder are not. However, in addition to this Calvinist appeal to (debt) forgiveness, there is more reason to ask for German clemency and support-and that is the macro-economic gain which the country enjoys because of the Eurozone (crisis).
This gain arises from the fact that from the German point of view, the euro is considerably undervalued, as a result of the large trade deficits of Southern Europe. A break-up of the Eurozone, it is generally expected, will lead to a large exchange rate appreciation vis-à-vis dollar and yen for Germany-by at least as much as 20% (Mazier and Petit 2013) . At the same time, of course, the euro is overvalued for the periphery-which is costing them dearly in terms of net export earning foregone. Mazier and Petit (2013) estimate that the current euro exchange rate represents a subsidy from the periphery to the core of about 5% of GDP. Germany, according to their numbers, has benefited from an implicit subsidy representing 8% of its GDP.
And as Koo (2010) argues, the extra German export growth-caused by the favourable exchange rate-enabled the German government to turn its "excessive" deficits into a small fiscal surplus.
Germans can be fiscally austere, courtesy of the periphery's trade deficit. This means that 
